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Introduction 
In Western Philosophy, there is an old tradition establishing an essential connection between an aesthetic, pleasing contemplation and that of the curiously perceiving theoretical 
spectator, who is interested in how the ''things themselves" really 
are, both of which points of view are opposed to dealing with 
things in a pragmatic context (i.e. as artifacL~). These two fonns of 
life, that of the artist and the philosopher or scientist, have thus 
been seen to have something in common, namely their way of 
viewing and experiencing the world, their "world." Let me 
paraphrase this way of experience the common phenomenological 
tenD with attitude. These "special" attitudes, long before the 
disciplines of aesthetics or epistemology came into being, have 
been referred to as theoria (as e.g. in Aristotle) or, later, as 
interesse loses Wohlgefallen, disinterested well-pleasing (e.g., in 
Kant).' However, whereas the Kantian notion of a disinterested. 
pleasurable viewing of the world outside of the rigid nexus of 
causality seems to lead into a purely contemplative aesthetics 
which can and should be achieved in order to reach a higher realm 
where we are freed from the "bad" and "mean" world-as 
Schopenhauer's aesthetics would have if-the Aristotelian notion 
of theoria still retains a close link between the philosophical and 
aesthetical attitudes in the following sense. Since the Greek world 
view (Weltanschauung) conceives of the world as kOsmos-which 
literally means decoration, even jewelry-viewing the world as it 
really is by philosophical contemplation means perceiving it as a 
universe of systematic order which is in itself understood as 
rationally structured and, therefore, beautiful. Philosophical 
contemplating is thus nothing but viewing the beauty of the world, 
which is otherwise disclosed to the common, obscured eye. 
Although the modem view on aesthetic contemplation (1 am not 
talking about the discipline of aesthetics) seems to be rather 
detached from the sphere of philosophy'-what could be more 
stem and rigid than philosophy, being thus in strong opposition to 
the playfulness and beauty of art? This has not always been the 
case--and needn't be, either. Furthennore, since, as is well-known, 
Husserl conceives of the attitude of the philosopher as a 
"disinterested onlooker," it seems that in him we have a modem 
witness to a position which enables us to reestablish a link between 
both attitudes which in their own ways open up a universal, 
totalizing view on the world. It was Husserl himself who drew 
attention to this more than external parallel. I shall try to show that 
this position can in fact let us gain a more universal and thus 
legitirnizable view on the role of art in our world. 
Thus, in my paper I will deal with these issues in four steps: both 
higher-order attitudes have an underlying stratum from which they 
emerge. Husserl has called this basic phenomenon of everyday-
existence the natural attitude; hence I ftrst want to give a short 
description of this attitude from where it is clear why this attitude 
has to be overcome (1). Second, 1 will sketch out HusserJ's theory 
of the phenomenological reduction, thus inaugurating the 
philosophical (or in his words: phenomenological) attitude (II). 
Next, 1 will elucidate Husserl's reflections on the aesthetical 
attitude which can only be understood on the basis of the 
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philosophical attitude. (III). Concluding, I will try 
to compare both attitudes and give the upshot of 
this parallel and the way we should account for art 
in a corresponding aesthetical attitude, thus 
spelling out Husserl"s intentions (IV). 
Generally speaking, my interest in this paper 
lies in the attitude of the one contemplating art, 
not in its representation or substantiation in 
concrete art forms, and it is my impression (from 
my very limited knowledge of this discipline) that 
contemporary art theory-even that which tries to 
remain faithful to phenomenological 
description-has neglected this (correlative) 
a~pect to a certain extent: 
I. The Natural Attitude 
The objection arising here, naturally, will be: if 
we intend to talk about the attitude of the artist and 
the philosopher, why start out the discussion with 
the "natural" attitude as the basic substratum? 
Shouldn't our aim be, precisely, to move away 
from this basic life form in order to arrive at these 
"higher-order" phenomena? True, but it is also 
Husserl's claim that all human activity rests on 
this basic phenomenon which he calls the natural 
attitude. Not only do all actions stem from and 
come forth from it, but also the philosophical and, 
respecti vely, the aesthetical attitude can only be 
characterized by that from which both of them 
radically differ, and that is, again-the natural 
attitude. Thus, it is indispensable to give a short 
description of this first attitude to understand the 
Husserlian conception; however, this first step 
will also have to show the finitude and limitedness 
of the natural attitude, for if it were in itself 
complete and self-sufficient, there would be no 
necessity to go beyond it. 
This attitude is determined by the so-called 
"general thesis of the natural attitude," meaning 
that it is our basic belief that the world in which 
we live, the things and people we have to do with, 
and ourselves as part of this world, exist.' In other 
words, we take this "existing" for granted, as it 
were, and this implies, to use yet another term, 
that the being of the world is "objectively" 
existing (being means being objectively). But a 
look at this objectivity reveals that it is always 
objectivity-for an experiencing subjectivity. World 
is always world-for-us (-for-me, -for-you). This 
correlation between world and experiencing 
subjectivity (in the broadest sense) Husserl has 
called the correlational apriori. Hence, the 
general thesis implies that the natural attitude 
knows nothing of this correlation; since we are 
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always intentionally directed towards things "out 
there" in the world, we neglect that the world is 
not existing for itself but for an experiencing 
("constituting") subjectivity. The natural attitude 
is in this sense naive, i.e., oblivious of the true 
nature of its being. The person in the natural 
attitude can be seen as (as Husserl sometimes calls 
it) a "sleeping monad." The monad has not yet 
awakend to its actual self-understanding. 
This naivety can have a positive and a negative 
connotation. The positive side is that the person 
living in this natural attitude is not "faulty" of 
being as he or she is, "always already"; it is not his 
or her fault to live in this way and therefore not 
"bad," but rather the basic mode of life people live 
in, everybody, no matter who he or she is, when 
we are in the daily modes of eating breakfast, 
taking a cab, asking for the time, etc. It is in this 
sense a basic life form we share in the objective 
world and that even the philosopher has to live in 
to a certain extent. The negative twist to the 
natural attitude, however, is that it is nevertheless 
limited since it is oblivious of the full meaning of 
this life. Its "straight forward" way of living 
towards the objective world means it has no notion 
of the experiencing subjectivity who "has" the 
world for its experience. It is thus oblivous of its 
own involvement in the process of having the 
world. 
Yet there is still another essential reason why 
the natural attitude is limited (which is merely an 
extension of the frrst notion). Living naturally, we 
don't know of this universal horizon called 
"world," which is Husserl's term for the 
objectivity of being. This normal executing of our 
life always lives itself out in a certain context or, 
as Husserl calls it, in a special world (Sonderwelt). 
Examples of these contextual life forms are the 
world of the home, of the job, of sports, business, 
etc. We know of these situational contexts, and we 
not only always already live in these worlds, but 
we always and unknowingly live in attitudes 
corresponding to these special worlds. However, 
and more significantly, we automatically switch 
attitudes and usually do so with great virtuosity: 
the moment we get in a car we switch to the 
"traffic attitude," while having immediately fazed 
out the sports attitude we just now occupied while 
having sat in the baseball stadium, etc. So this 
switching around between many (maybe 
innumerable) attitudes corresponding to special 
worlds goes on within the natural attitude. This 
behaviour is completely normal and thus belongs 
to the natural attitude itself. 
But to get at its limitedness, let's take a look at 
what is implied in an attitude as such. Within an 
attitude I have certain experiences, in Husserl's 
words: acts, which are directed at something. 
However, it is the very essence of an act to not 
have the thing "completely," I will only see one 
side or profile of a thing, with the back side 
unseen. But this back side can be made seen, e.g., 
by turning the thing around. Hence (to say it in a 
very condensed form) an intentional act has the 
character of a necessary unfuIfilment which points 
beyond (to a "plus ultra"); it is not isolated but 
takes place within a referential ne:(us. However 
this nexus of pointing beyond is endless, there are 
always more aspects which are unseen, hence the 
acts are directed to an endless horizon-and 
'world' is precisely the name for this horizon. 
Now adding the phenomenon of attitude to this, it 
is clear that if all acts stem from an attitude, then 
this attitude will itself be endless in the sense that 
there is no limit to the acts to be directed from the 
horizon of an attitude correlating the horizon of 
the world these acts are directed to. 
Considering that we are talking of special 
worlds and attitudes, we can now clarify what is 
limited about them. If each attitude is directed 
towards its endless horizon, it can essentially 
never transcend this horizon. But we were 
speaking of special worlds: that of sports, that of 
business, etc. There is no criteria to privilege one 
over the other. They are, in other words, relative 
upon each other. But if being in one attitude means 
never coming to an end within its confmes, then 
this attitude does not realize its relativity. In other 
words, it takes itself as absolute. And this is 
precisely its limitedness: it sets itself as absolute 
where it is in fact only relative. 
But have we not said before that our natural life 
is always already carried out in such a way that we 
constantly switch between attitudes? Yes, but we 
are naive about it, we are not aware of doing so. 
This does not mean to blur the disctinction 
between the relativities, but this in fact proves 
their "existence." since it is one part of this natural 
attitude to not be aware about this what "always 
already" goes on-and besides, it does happen 
that one gets, a.~ it were, "stuck" in one attitude, be 
it that one has a car accident by being attuned to 
the voice on the radio or that of his boss minutes 
before, etc., and down to what we call plain 
"narrow-mindedness," which means precisely 
somebody's inability to see the world differently 
than from his or her point of view" 
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II. The Reduction and 
the Pbenomenological Attitude 
Thus, if the task of philosophy is to overcome 
any kind of unreflected presuppositions, it is clear 
from what has been said that the naivety of the 
natural attitude must be made explicit, and making 
it explicit means already having gone beyond it. 
But what excactly is the reason for this leaving 
behind, if 'naivety' is to mean more than a mere 
polemicaJ. term? Simply put: If the one living in 
the natural attitude does not know of this essential 
relativity, he or she cannot claim to have full self-
transparency about him- or herself. If philosophy 
in its most original sense is about enlightening 
humankind and oneself, it makes sense postulating 
to overcome the natural attitude in order to gain a 
universaL uninhibited view on life. The method 
Husserl employs in order to attain this is the 
phenomenological reduction. Without wanting to 
delve too deeply into this method of revealing 
transcendental subjectivity, I want to focus on the 
"metaphilosophical" intentions Husserl pursues in 
this method. Very generally speaking, uncovering 
transcendental subjectivity is nothing but 
revealing humankind's most essential possibilities 
as a rational being. In doing so, it is radical self-
introspection and inquiry. If it is about the loss of 
naivety, then one task in this methodic step is to 
reveal these relativities we are stuck in in the 
natural attitude. This does not in any way mean 
annihilating them-so little as the reduction 
means gaining a view from nowhere or living in 
an ivory tower-but understanding them in their 
relati vity. 
Thus, the natural attitude cannot be abandoned 
or nullified. it can only be understood.7 It is this 
full understanding that Husserl means by the term 
absolute, the attaining of which being an endless 
limit idea. It is only then that each individual can 
claim for him- or herself to completely legitimize 
one's own actions, if they are understood in the 
absolute, encompassing consciousness of 
transcendental life. Thus, the philosopher in 
Husserl's view (the one performing the reduction) 
is not leaving the world, is not detaching him- or 
herself from action or dispensing oneself from 
responsibility; rather, he or she is (and is only 
then) the full person (or monad), fully awakend to 
the understanding of one's own ultimate 
possibilities. It is only then that he or she can 
claim to take over responsibility for one's own 
actions and for those of everybody else-
everybody else, in other words, who has not come 
to the realization of being caught in the confines of 
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the natural attitude. From this perspective we can 
understand Husserl's characterization of the 
philosophers as "functionaries of mankind.'" 
In this tour de force in outlining the meaning of 
the reduction, I have skipped the question of how 
this reduction is at all motivated. If the natural 
attitude is so limited and in this limitedness at the 
same time endless, how can it ever be possible to 
overcome it? Is this not futile or an undertaking 
comparable to that of the legendary baron 
Miinchhausen who pulls himself out of the swamp 
by his own hair? Husserl has had some trouble 
coming to tenns with this problem which he 
clearly saw, but has tried to give a number of 
answers. One solution is comparable to the 
Platonian-Aristotelian thaumdzein . It is 
astonishment that comes over certain individuals 
which renders them speechless before the beauty 
of the cosmos and leads them to abandon their old 
dogmas and beliefs and to gain a new position on 
the world, that of the pure theoria . Husserl once, 
in a letter to the poet von Hofmannsthal, frames it 
in another ancient methaphor: 
As soon as the sphinx of knowledge has 
posed its question, as soon as we have 
gazed into the abysmal problem of the 
possibility of a knowledge which is carried 
out only in subjective experiences and yet 
grasps an objectivity existing for itself, 
then our stance on all pregiven knowledge 
and on all pregiven being [ .. . J has become 
radically different. Everything [has 
become J questionable, everything 
incomprehensible, enigmatic!9 
Thus, the philosopher-or, strictly speaking, 
he/she who becomes a philosopher by 
experiencing this being overcome by unanswerble 
questions, does not become so by his or her own 
will or initiative, but because enigmatic questions 
arise and pose themselves. The sphinx of 
knowledge is a metaphor for genuine curiosity 
originally inborn in the human race, which is 
always already covered up by the situational 
concerns and everyday problems of the natural 
attitude. In other words, one becomes drawn in 
into this sphere which detaches us from this 
original state of affairs, a sphere where everything 
we once took as known, becomes enigmatic. We 
have now become "disinterested spectators" 
"above" the natural attitude. This sphere we are 
now attuned to in an uninterested way, to Husser!, 
is nothing but that of radical self-introspection 
which one has no knowledge of in the natural 
attitude. It is the sphere of the full and real self 
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which is still a terra incognitdO in the beginning, 
after having just perfonned the reduction, but 
which we can inquire into, And in Husserl's belief 
in philosophy as rigorous science, we are called 
upon to systematically analyze it as "disinterested 
spectators," But this "sphere" or "region" as one 
can metaphorically call it, is of course radically 
different from any (actual) sphere in the world. 
This means, concretely speaking, that we cannot 
have any preconception of the typicality of that 
which we are about to experience as we have in 
worldly experience: whatever I will encounter in 
the world I will know in its typicality (e.g., I might 
not know this certain thing, but I will understand 
it is a thing, etc.). Performing the reduction means 
giving up on any preconceived typicality without 
which we could not live naturally. 
So, we can say, we have reduced ourselves to 
absolute poverty of knowledge, we know nothing 
of that which is "to come." But this "poverty" is 
not an empoverishment; quite to the contrary: it 
harbours an absolute potentiality or freedom: 
since we are not limited in any way by relativities 
whatsoever, we have the theoretical freedom of 
thinking through every possibility, of entering any 
sphere of the mind. Everything is possible and 
thinkable, we can enjoy the theoretical delight, as 
it were, to let our thoughts roam freely, to try out 
new possibilities, to let ourselves be creative, etc. 
This freedom is thus the mark of creativity which 
great thought harbours and which is opposed to 
the relativities and pragmatically oriented ways of 
thought of everyday existence, where our 
considerations are always limited by their 
pragmatical context. Philosophical thought as 
Husserl understands it, is the absolutely unleashed 
and instantiated freedom of the rational mind 
which is open toward every region of the world 
and every possibility to be thought through by 
imagination-:-however not in this "playful" sense 
alone but in order to fulfill the very essence of 
humanity in a responsible and legitimized way by 
systematically working through the now open 
horizons of problems, If I may say so, 
phenomenology is emphatically "joyful science." 
I realize that I have now characterized 
Husserl's view of the philosophical attitude in 
quite an unorthodox way; however, my aim was to 
spell out Husserl's concrete intentions on the one 
hand (which all too often are covered up by his 
sometimes cryptic talk of the transcendental life) 
and on the other to fonnulate it in a way to be in a 
position to compare it to the aesthetical attitude, 
which I shall undertake now. 
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m. The Aesthetical Attitude 
Husserl's claim is now that the philosophical 
and aesthetical attitudes have essential features in 
common. and if this is so, they must share this 
commonality over against its opposite focal point: 
the natural attitude. Let's again see what Husserl 
has to say about the aesthetical attitude, once more 
quoting from HusserJ's famous letter to Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal: 
Contemplation of a purely aesthetical art-
piece is carried out in rigorous inhibition of 
any existential positing [Stellungnahme) by 
the intellect or every positing by feeling 
and will, which pressupose an existential 
positing. Or more precisely: The art-piece 
puts us in the position of (as it were, draws 
us into ) a state of purely aesthetical 
contemplation which excludes every 
positing. The more the existential world i,~ 
posited or is called upon in it~ liveliness. 
the more existential positing the art-piece 
asks for .. .. the less aesthetically pure is it. 
.. .. [The "existential attitude" is) the 
counter-pole to the mental attitude 
[GeisteshaltungJ of purely aesthetical 
contemplation and of the state of mood 
accompanying it" 
Although Husserl is certainly a child of his 
time, especially in his privileging of the 
"aesthetically pure" art-piece (which is apparently 
purer the less sensual representation it has '2}-and 
in no way do I want to defend this-let us see, 
rather, what we can get out of this definition in 
comparison with what his been said regarding the 
philosophical attitude in order to gain a more 
satisfying picture of what Husserl can offer for a 
theory of the aesthetical attitude. 
The frrst feature both the philosophical and 
aesthetical attitudes have in common is that, 
according to Husserl, both of them no longer stand 
on the basis of the natural attitude. Aesthetical 
contemplation, just as philosophical theoretizing, 
excludes any positing of something as existing. 
Does that mean what we contemplate in the 
aesthetical attitude is less real or even non-
existing? Not at all. Rather, what goes on in the 
"aesthetical reduction," as we may call it, is a 
certain neutrality modification, which means that 
we no longer are in the usual, pragmatical contexts 
(the special worlds in their relativity) but in a 
different stance which is completely different 
from the usual special attitudes. In other words, 
the world is now not posited as existing-as it is 
in one way or the other in any natural artitude-
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but is turned into a phenomenon. In the neutrality 
modification it has the index of the "as if." This 
does not in any way mean it is less real for us 
contemplators. but we have detached ourselves 
from the pragmatical context of our everyday 
existence and view the world in the mode of the 
"as if."" We have become "disinterested 
spectators" in the sense that we view the totality of 
what is outside of any pragmatically limited 
context. • 
So if we see a ;;normal" scene of such a 
pragrnatical context in. say. a painting or a movie. 
it is clear that we are not participating in it. on the 
one hand (we are tmparticipating spectators). and 
on the other. it in no way means that we are not 
seeing this scene as what it is-a pragmatical 
one--or that we cannot partake in the emotions it 
evokes (sadness or happiness. etc.) but that we do 
so in the mode of the "as if ': this scene is as if it 
were real (and the better the art piece the better its 
depiction" ). However the compassion or sorrow I 
feel is in fact real; there is no feeling-as-if. 
However. this feeling I have which accompanies 
my contemplation is detached from myself in the 
sense that it is in fact my pain. etc .. but not 
pertaining to me. although by the law of 
motivation this scene might remind me of a 
similar event I myself might have witnessed 
earlier. I am detached from it in the sense that I do 
not merely perceive it as something I myself have 
to engage in but which reveals to me the "truth" of 
this context as such. 
So. one might ask. what is so special about this 
contemplating if the only difference between 
witnessing it in my daily existence and that of 
contemplating it in an art piece is that one is in fact 
real and the other is experienced as phenomenon? 
This neutralizing of the existing world can only 
occur on the basis that every special attitude 
within the natural attitude is limited to its certain 
world: the world of sports. of business. etc. But 
the reason these attitudes are limited is precisely 
because they are limited to that existing world. 
The sports attitude cannot transcend the world of 
sports. etc. However. the aesthetical attitude 
(alongside the philosophical one) on the other 
hand has the freedom to view all of these special 
worlds in the aesthetical attitude, precisely 
because it neutralizes the existence positing in the 
same way as in the phenomenological reduction. 
If the whole world becomes aesthetically reduced, 
everything in it can be viewed in this modification 
as aesthetical. The whole world has taken on a 
new meaning, and once this new attitude has been 
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attaine<L it is impossible to go back into the old 
state of affairs. Art can reveal the world to US as it 
has never been seen before, precisely by showing 
us the world as it always and usually is, but in an 
attitude in which it has never been attained before. 
As such, it can for the first time truly open up the 
world for us. The Mona Lisa can for the first time 
reveal to us what it mean:; to look ambiguously. 
Beethoven's Fifth Symphony can reveal to us 
what it means to be afraid of death. We are seeing 
the same world, but with new eyes. 
Now there seems to be another parallel to the 
philosophical attitude which is important to 
Hus serl , namely the question of how this attitude 
can be attained. It is precisely this power the art 
piece can gain over us which draw:; us into its 
realm, and that means, correlatively speaking, to 
lift us up out of the natural attitude. The encounter 
with art can stun us, bewilder us, scare us, 
fascinate us, giving us experiences that radically 
break open the attitude we live in normally. Being 
as such, it shows us not only the world, but also 
ourselves in a different light. Thi:; radical change 
of attitude means nothing else than getting to 
know ourselves in a way that is impossible in any 
context within the natural attitude. This break in 
our normal living can happen by a slow shifting, 
e.g., in a realist painting where the scene presented 
seems to be almost like a photo with nothing 
special about it-but it is this normality in the 
depiction that we would otherwise never see 
because we are always already immersed in the 
context depicted now. Or the break can be drastic, 
even violent, when our whole style of perception 
is changed, e.g., in surrealistic paintings where the 
whole act of seeing is called into question (and the 
same would go for a 12 tone symphony in the 
tonal art piece). 
In short, the art piece has the power to lift us 
out of the natural attitude. In this sense, what 
motivates the aesthetical reduction i:; nothing but 
art itself, thus changing our whole attitude in a 
way that it excludes the general positing of the 
being of the world. If this attitude is attaine<L it is 
not the world that has changed, it is rather 
ourselves who have changed our view on the 
world and ourselves as a whole, in a way that we 
see the world as we never could before. Whereas 
everything is called into question, becomes 
enigmatic, a new meaning, a new sense arises 
through art which make us understand the world 
more fully. This understanding is again not 
radically different from natural "knowledge" but 
makes this understanding explicit. The aesthetical 
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reduction thus does not alter the sense of the 
world, but places it into an encompa,~sing , 
universal understanding which is in this very 
universality comparable to the phenomenogical 
reduction. 
It is from here that we can, concludingly, spell 
out the philosophical consequences from this 
analogy. 
IV. Philosophical and Aesthetical Attitudes 
as Ways of Getting to Understand the World 
Now. if the phenomenological and the 
aesthetical reduction can be compared and in this 
sense explicated, as Husser! has it, then there must 
be, concludingly, one more parallel which can 
show us the consequence for the role of art in the 
system of philosophy, as well as give us a clue for 
a phenomenological theory of art. 
Probably the most important trait of the 
phenomenological attitude is the freedom of 
thought which it can attain due to it~ detachment 
from the natural attitude where nothing is 
principally unknown but pre-known in its 
typicality. Since it has no typicality in its new 
sphere, it begin:; at the point of absolute poverty 
but from there has the ability to build up sound 
and philosophically legtimizable knowledge in 
absolute freedom and as such serve humanity's 
inborn telos of self-understanding. If the parallel 
between both attitudes is plausible, this must also 
hold for the aesthetical attitude. And it is, I 
believe, in fact so. There is no sphere where there 
is more freedom than in art. Art has no limits 
wbatsoever, "everything goes" here, we are not 
bound to space and time and their laws. Likewise, 
the aesthetical reduction reduces the aesthetical 
spectator to absolute poverty: he or she cannot 
take over any preconceived notions from the 
original sphere, but this poverty proves to be the 
greatest richness for the absolute freedom of 
human activity, beginning from thought but 
extending to every form of human behaviour. 
However, it i:; this far-reaching extending 
which makes it so powerful. For this "anything 
goes" is not to be mistaken with arbitrariness. And 
this is where this freedom is limited and in this it 
i,~ again conceived in parallel to the role of 
philosophy. The philosopher as a "functionary of 
mankind" must not just enjoy his theoretical 
contemplation and thus remain detacbed from the 
worl<L but he or she must re-inworld him- or 
herself, make the results of this research known to 
others and as such take over responsibility for 
humankind as such, which is nothing else than that 
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which he or she has revealed in regressing back 
into the depths of one' s transcendental 
subjectivity, where he or she will fmd nothing but 
the essence of subjectivity as such, which reveals 
it<;elf to be transcendental intersubjectivity. 
Likewise does the artist have a duty for 
mankind. Art's purpose is not mere aesthetical 
well-pleasing which offers a certain "relaxation" 
from our everyday life, but the artist must partake 
in the universal task to understand humanity- not 
in the scientific sense, i.e., as philosophy as 
rigorous science (and any other positive science) 
does, but in its own way and in its own forms of 
realizing the freedom of humankind as such which 
is no longer bound to any particular set of values 
or context~ . What Schiller has once said about 
theatre thus would in Husserl's eyes apply to art as 
such: it must be a "moral institution" (rrwralische 
Anstalt), not in the sense of teaching people a 
certain set of values but of posing existential 
questions, e.g., what value as such is life, death, 
being? Delving into the dephts of the human soul, 
it must then likewise "rein world" itself (in a 
concrete art form) in order to have the concrete 
possibility to draw people into it or, meaning the 
same thing, lift them up out of the natural attitude. 
In this sense, thi~ position would radically be 
opposed to that of, say, Adorno, according to 
whom "lyrics after Ausschwitz is impossible." 
Quite to the contrary, art is called upon to assume 
its role in the context of a humane world. It would 
be absurd, say, to view a movie like Schindler s 
List in an aesthetical attitude in the ordinary sense 
(as a purely disinterested well-pleasing). More 
than that, it would be irresponsible. This movie 
can only be understood if viewed in its 
enlightening function. 
But whereas philosophy in the Husserlian sense 
is bound to scientific analysis and systematic 
knowledge, it seems to me that art is much freer in 
the possibilities of its stylistic formations, and this 
is the reason it can have much more impact on 
people, since it doesn ' t have to theoretize to make 
its point. Rather, it has the freedom of a truly 
playful, joyful wisdom which has by far not been 
exhausted. Forms of this freedom which are 
external to philosophy would be satire, where 
something is grossly exaggerated for the sake of 
emphasis; irony, where something is said "around 
the comer" or from its opposite extreme; humor, 
which makes it possible to attack somebody 
without hurting his or her feelings ; allegory, where 
constellations or structures become transparent; 
metaphor, where something is expressed precisely 
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in its special and precious nature which otherwise 
would have remained hidden-and all other forms 
and devices we love art for.15 
Thus, I want to end these considerations on a 
more jocular note. At the end of his letter to von 
Hofrnannsthal, Husserl becomes aware of this role 
as rigorous philosopher and actually transgresses 
this sphere in a self-ironical, self-referential way: 
[Here goes] the incorrigible and genuine 
profllSsor [again]! He cannot open his 
mouth without giving a lecture.. . . I shall 
not even begin saying anything about your 
works. I think you are indifferent enough 
towards praise as well as criticism and wise 
talk: of any sort. And certainly and visibly 
do you know the three golden rules of the 
artist (in the broadest sense), which are at 
the same time the open secrets of all true 
grandeur, namely: I) that he have genius; 
this he has in any case, otherwise he is no 
artist; 2) that he follow purely and only his 
demon in the way it drives him from inside 
to spectating-blind effecting; 3) Everybody 
else knows it better anyway, thus he ought 
to view them all-either aesthetically or 
phenomenologically. I' 
Notes 
I It is interesting to note that the discipline of 
aesthetics is actually a very late development 
within the canonized philosophical systematics 
of Western philosophy; the first Aesthetics (in the 
modern sense) comes from Baumgarten in 
1750/58: Aesthetica (2 vots). Cf. Historisches 
Worterbuch der Philosophie, ed . J. Ritter, 
Darmstadt 1971, Vol. I, col. 555-64. 
2 Cf. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and 
Representation, Part IV. However, although 
Schopenhauer criticizes Kant's theory of 
aesthetic in the Critique of Judgment (essentially 
for not doing justice to "real" art), his theory 
could in fact be seen to have the intention to 
"make" Kant "true." 
J Although posonodem thought has significantly 
dealt with art and aesthetics . I believe the 
philosophico-historical roots for this lie for the 
most part in Heidegger's turn to art in the time of 
his Kehre, cf. "Der Ursprung des Kunsterkes" 
(1935/36), in: Holzwege, Klostermann 1950, pp. 
1-72. 
• Cf. A. Casebier, Film and Phenomenology 
(Cambridge 1991), which has the subtitle: 
"Toward a Realist Theory of Cinematic 
Representation." Here we find a fine analysis of 
cinematographic representation in a Husserlian 
vein (with. however, mainly taking the Logical 
Investigations and Ideas I into consideration), 
however no attention whatsoever is paid to the 
phenomenon of attitude correlating any kind of 
cinematographic presentation. 
, Cf. Ideas I, §§ 27-32. 
6 However, it does not take a philosopher to detect 
simple narrow-mindedness! For a more detailed 
treatment of the theory of the natural attitude, cf. 
my "Husser!'s Phenomenological Discovery of 
the Natural Attitude," in Continental Philosophy 
Review 31 (1998), pp. 153- 170. 
7 Cf. Cartesian Meditations, The Hague 1950 
(transl. D. Cairns). p. 151: "phenomenological 
explication does nothing bw explicate the sense 
this world has for us all, prior to any 
philosophizing, and obviously gets solely from 
our experience - a sense which philosophy can 
uncover but never alter .... " 
• Cf. The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston 
1970), p. 17. 
9 From Husserl's letter to Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal, Jan. 12, 1907, in: Edmund 
Husserl, Briefwechsel, ed. by Karl and Elisabeth 
Schuhmann, DordrechtIBostonILondon 1993, 
Husserliana-Dokurnente mn, p. 134 (my 
translation). Cf. also Hua. XXlV, p. 397 ff. 
10 As such, Husserl also calls it "das gelobte Land" 
(the "promised land") of philosophy. Cf. Hua. V, 
p. 161. 
11 "Die Anschauung eines rein iisthetischen 
Kunstwerks vollzieht sich in strenger 
Ausschaltung jeder existenzialen Stellungnahme 
des Intellects und jeder Stellungnahme des 
Gefiihls u. Willens, die solche eine existenziale 
Stellungnahme voraussetzt. Oder besser: Das 
Kunstwerk versetzt uns (erzwingt es gleichsam) 
in den Zustand rein iisthetischer, jene 
Stellungnahme ausschlieBenden Anschauung. Je 
mehr von der Existenzialen Welt anklingt oder 
lebendig herangezogen wird, je mehr an 
existenzialer Stellungnahme das Kunstwerk von 
sich aus anfordert [ ... j, urn so weniger ist das 
Werk iisthetisch rein . [ ... ] [Die natiirliche 
Einstellung ist] der Gegenpol zur Geisteshaltung 
der rein iisthetischen Anschauung und der ihr 
entsprechenden Gefiihlslage." Op. cit., p. 133 f. 
(my translation). It should be added that this 
letter is from 1907, when Husserl had just 
"discovered" the method of the 
phenomenological reduction, and hence his 
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terminology is not yet fully developed. 
However, I think it is clear from the content that 
this description of the "positing" of the 
"existential world" is essentially the same 
phenomenon as that what he, as of 1913 (firstly 
in the Ideas I), terms "natural attitude." 
I; One might note that Schopenhauer was one of 
the first philosophers Husserl read in his youth. 
Schopenhauer's privileging of music over every 
other art form might play a role in Husser!'s 
position here. 
13 Cf. Husserliana VIII, pp. 112-120 (on positional 
and quasi-positional acts). 
14 In this sense, I would object to Husserl's thesis 
that the art piece is "purer" the less 
"existentiality" it has. As it is, one would have to 
define the sense of "pure" here more in detail. 
IS I want to leave open the question what this 
would mean for an aesthetics where these 
disciplines are precisely merged, e.g. in 
Nietzsche 's "philosophy," in which it is his 
point that philosophy becomes aestheticized. 
Certainly, for Husserl it would be unhealthy to 
merge disciplines. But maybe in this point 
Husserl is mistaken. 
16 Letter to von Hoffmansthal, op. cit, p. 135 f. 
"Der unverbesserliche u. unverfalschte 
Professor! Er kann nieht den Mund aufthun, 
ohne ein Colleg zu halten! [ ... ] tiber Ihre Werke 
etwas zu sagen, werde ich mich sehr hi.iten. Ich 
denke, Lob wie Tadel und weises Gerede jeder 
Art sind Ihnen schon hinreichend gleichgiltig. 
Und die drei goldenen Regeln des Kiinstlers (im 
weitesten Sinne), zugleich die offenen 
Geheimnisse aller wahren GroBe, sind Ihnen 
sicherlich und sichtbarlich bekannt: namlicb I) 
Er habe Genie - das hat er ohnehin, sonst ist er 
kein Ktinstler. 2) Er folge rein und einzig 
seinem Daimonion, wie es ibn von innen her zu 
schauend-blindem WITken treibt. 3) Aile 
Anderen wissen es ohnehin besser, also 
betrachte er sie alle - bloB iisthetisch oder 
phlinomenologisch. " 
